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Water Rights and National Forests-
Narrowing the Implied Reservation
Doctrine: United States v. New Mexico
In United States v. New Mexico' the United States Supreme Court
significantly reduced the federal government's ability to use the "implied
reservation" doctrine to claim water rights in the western states for use in
national forests. According to the implied reservation doctrine, Congress,
in reserving portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes,
such as national parks, national forests, Indian reservations and national
monuments, authorizes the reservation of "appurtenant water than [sic]
unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation., 2 The doctrine is a hybrid form of water law that resulted from
the unique position of the United States as owner of vast amounts of land
in the western part of the country, combined with the peculiar demands of
life in the arid western states.
By narrowly defining the purposes for which national forests have
been, or may be established, the Court in New Mexico limited the purposes
for which water can be appropriated for use in national forests under the
implied reservation doctrine. This Case Comment will examine the
development of the implied reservation doctrine, critically analyze the
basis of the Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico, and discuss
the possible effects of that decision.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Law of Prior Appropriation
The practical and legal significance of United States v. New Mexico
can best be understood in its historical context. This history was shaped by
the manner in which the western lands were settled and by a novel type of
water law that evolved as a result of both that settlement and the arid
character of the land. The law of prior appropriation, which was a
pronounced break from the earlier common-law system of riparian water
rights, developed out of custom and necessity, initially in the realm of
mining and later in the cultivation of the arid western land.
1. A Comparison of Prior Appropriation and Riparian Water Law
The riparian system of water rights can generally be described as a
system in which the owner of riparian land has a right to use the stream in
such a way that he does not cause harm either to the natural flow of the
1. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
2. Id. at 700.
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river3 or to beneficial uses of the water by other riparians The riparian
system is premised on the idea that an owner's property rights in land
adjacent to a stream include the right to use the water contiguous to it.5
Unlike the common-law riparian system, the law of prior appropria-
tion does not vest water rights in accordance with the ownership of land on
the banks of a stream or river. Instead, the right to the use of water is
dependent on a priority system-the first taker has the right to all the water
he can put to beneficial use at the time of the diversion. Under this system,
water may be diverted from its natural watercourse and used on lands far
removed from the watercourse.
2. The Development of the Law of Prior Appropriation
The system of prior appropriation was developed during the gold rush
when water was diverted from natural watercourses to mines, often some
3. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
Under [the natural flow] theory the primary or fundamental right of each riparian proprietor
of a watercourse is to have the body of water flow as it was wont to flow in nature, qualified
only by the privilege of each to make limited uses of the water.
The legal consequences of this theory are as follows:
(1) An unprivileged use of water that perceptibly depletes the volume of water on a
riparian proprietor's land violates that proprietor's right to the natural condition of the water
and is actionable by him, even though it interferes with no use that he is making and causes
him no tangible harm ...
(4) Riparian privileges are limited to use of the water on or in connection with a use of
riparian land and consequently are not transferable apart from that land to nonriparians. A
grant purporting to make a transfer does not pass privileges as against riparian proprietors; at
most it bars the grantor from complaining of his grantee's nonriparian use.
In the early days of the Industrial Revolution when many mills and factories were
powered by water, the doctrine served a very utilitarian purpose as it passed the water down
from one mill dam to the next. In today's economy it is not utilitarian and prohibits many
beneficial uses of water although those uses may be causing no one any harm and although the
water would run to waste if not so used.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41, Topic 3, Scope Note, at 210-11 (1979).
4. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
Under the reasonable use theory the primary or fundamental right of each riparian proprietor
on a watercourse or lake is to be free from unreasonable uses that cause harm to his own
reasonable use of the water. Emphasis is placed on a full and beneficial use of the advantages
of the stream or lake, and each riparian proprietor has a privilege to make a reasonable use of
water for any purpose, provided that his use does not cause harm to the reasonable uses of
others. Each riparian must make his use in a manner that will accommodate as many other
uses as possible.
The legal consequences of this theory are as follows:
(I) There is, in its strictest application, no primary right in anyone to have the natural
integrity of a stream or lake maintained for its own sake. The primary right of a riparian
proprietor is to receive protection for his reasonable use of the stream or lake from an
unreasonable use by another ...
(7) The riparian privileges of use, not being limited to use on or in connection with the use
of riparian land, may include reasonable non-riparian uses, and may to that extent be
transferred apart from the land to non-riparians.
The major advantage of this theory is that it tends to promote the beneficial use of water
resources.
The reasonable use theory has won an almost complete victory in the courts, although a
considerable amount of natural flow language can still be found, ...
Id. at 211.
5. "Riparian law is the basic common law of water rights to streams in the eastern, midwestern
and southern states." F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 15 (National Water
Commission, Legal Study No. 5, 1971) (citation omitted).
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distance away. It was first judicially recognized in Irwin v. Phillips,6 in
which the California Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the system
because it was well suited to the needs of miners and had been tacitly
recognized by both the United States Congress and the California
legislature as a means of facilitating the development of mineral
resources.7 Because there was no precedent, the court based its opinion
upon a simple recognition of current political and social conditions.
As mining became less significant and agriculture more important,
settlers began to realize the need for irrigation. Thus, the system of prior
appropriation quite naturally was adapted for use on these newly settled
lands. As one commentator explained:
It was a doctrine especially well suited for a pioneering economy based upon
the settlement of vacant lands. The first settler to come into a valley chose his
land. If irrigation water was needed, he dug a ditch from the stream to his
land. Whether his land was located on the stream or not was immaterial since
there was no one to object to his use of the water. The second settler to follow
him into the valley had to respect the first settler's homestead and take second
choice of the land, and he had to respect the first appropriator's right to the
water and irrigate his land with what was left.
3. Application of the Law of Prior Appropriation to Public Land
Problems arose during the settlement of the unsurveyed western
region because many early homesteaders had dug irrigation ditches across
federally-owned land to their homesteads. As one commentator stated:
"[T]he state and territorial laws applied to these people as well as to those
confining their activities to patented land. They were residents and citizens,
and their conduct on the public domain as well as on the streets of settled
towns was of concern to the local government."9 Thus, the question arose
whether an owner of land patented by the United States at a later date
could deny an earlier appropriator the right to use a ditch previously dug
across the newly-patented land. Additionally, there was a question
whether the new owner could claim a riparian right superior to that of the
prior appropriator. These questions were resolved in 1866, when Congress
passed an act that recognized those vested water rights on public land that
were acknowledged under state law and any rights of way incidental to
those rights. 10 Congress clarified this statute in 1870" by adding a
provision that the rights of any new patentees were subject to "any vested
and accrued water rights" recognized by the Act of 1866.12
6. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
7. Id. at 146.
8. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 23.
9. Id. at 24. A land patent is a "muniment of title issued by a government or state for the
conveyance of some portion of the public domain." BtAcK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1013 (5th ed. 1979).
10. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251.
11. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217.
12. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). This Act was derived from the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14
Stat. 251, and the Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217.
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Although the Acts of 1866 and 1870 settled the issue of the validity of
the appropriative rights recognized by state and territorial courts prior to
1866, they did not clearly resolve the validity of appropriations made after
that date.13 Much of the confusion surrounded state court interpretations
of the Desert Land Act of 1877,14 which was enacted to encourage the
reclamation of arid public lands.' 5 It allowed diversions sufficient to
reclaim a maximum of 640 acres1 6 of land, but the right of use depended on
"bona fide prior appropriation."" The Act also required all nonnavigable,
unappropriated waterways on public lands to be "held free for
appropriation and use of the public," including mining, irrigation, and
manufacturing. 18
The states were left virtually unguided in the task of interpreting the
scope of rights granted federal patentees under the Acts of 1866 and 1870
and the Desert Land Act. As a result of various interpretations of these
Acts, three distinct doctrines were promulgated by the state courts.
The California doctrine was based on the theory that the federal
government had both sovereignty over and proprietary rights to the
western lands before they were made into states. 9 By reason of their
sovereignty upon admission to the Union, however, the states could
determine the rights that pertained to federal as well as private ownership
of property.20 Under the doctrine, appropriative and riparian rights
continued to coexist; a patentee of federal land received whatever rights
the federal government had under state law, which, in California, were
riparian rights. These riparian rights were subject to those earlier
appropriative rights recognized by the Act of 1866, the Desert Land Act of
1877, and any other appropriative right that existed at the time of a patent
of federal land granted under any other statute.
A second theory, the Oregon doctrine, 21 recognized those riparian
rights actually exercised through beneficial use of the water prior to
adoption of the Desert Land Act with a priority as of the date of entry; all
rights arising thereafter had to be established in compliance with this
statutory system that used the appropriative concept."Z2 According to this
theory, the Desert Land Act had established a uniform rule of
appropriative rights to be applied to all patentees of federal land.
13. Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUm. L, REV. 967,
971 (1960).
14. Ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377.
15. See California Ore. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935),
16. The acreage limitation was later decreased to 320 acres. 43 U.S.C. § 212 (1976).
17. Id. § 321.
18. Id.
19. The doctrine is exemplified by Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
20. Id. at 337-38, 10 P. at 720-21. At this time California had adopted common-law riparinnism.
21. The leading case is Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 98 P. 1083 (1909).
22. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use
of Water, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 639, 645.
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Finally, the Colorado doctrine23 was based on the theory that the
United States, although sovereign over western waters, had no proprietary
rights in them and had accorded full control over water to each state upon
its grant of statehood. Thus, as sovereigns, it was the states that determined
which system of water rights should prevail. Under this approach, only the
law of prior appropriation was recognized, because that system of water
law was considered to be the most appropriate one for the arid states
adopting the Colorado doctrine.24
Thus, judicial exploration of the scope of the Desert Land Act
afforded a basis for the conflicting assertions that a "uniform federal rule of
appropriative rights for waters on the public domain had been established,
and that full authority had been conferred on the states to control the use
and disposition of such waters. 25
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict of
theories in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.26
The Court held that the adoption of the law of prior appropriation was a
matter for the states and that a homestead patent granted by the United
States did not carry with it the common-law rights of riparian ownership.
Instead, it said, the measure of private rights is that which was recognized
by local rules and customs. The Court interpreted the Desert Land Act of
1877 as effecting a "severance of all waters upon the public domain, not
theretofore appropriated, from the land itself. 27 "From that premise," the
Court continued, "it follows that a patent issued thereafter for lands in a
desert-land state or territory, under any of the land laws of the United
States, carried with it, of its own force, no common law right to the water
flowing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed."25 From this
language, it was also clear that water could be appropriated on any public
land in the states listed in the Act, not just arid or desert land.
Thus, the adoption of either the riparian or prior appropriation
systems of water law in a given state has depended to a large degree on the
history and needs of the particular state.
4. Elements of the Law of Prior Appropriation
Currently, the law of prior appropriation has several distinct elements
that a water user must meet to have a valid appropriation. The basis of the
law of prior appropriation is beneficial use, not land ownership as under
23. The leading case is Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). New Mexico had
adopted the Colorado doctrine in both its Constitution (N.M. CONsT. art. 16, §§ 1-3) and statutorylaw
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1(1978)), and also officially abrogated the common-law riparian system in
Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gutierrez, 10 N.M. 177, 61 P. 357 (1900), aff'd, 188 U.S. 545
(1903).
24. For a more detailed treatment of the three doctrines, see Note, supra note 13, at 972-75.
25. Id. at 971-72 (citations omitted).
26. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
27. Id. at 158.
28. Id. See also note 29 and accompanying text infra.
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the riparian system. A court may find any number of uses to be beneficial,
ranging from irrigation to industrial uses, and is free to recognize new
ones.29 Additionally, because prior appropriation is not based on
ownership of land adjacent to a stream, the water can be transported away
from the watercourse and even used in separate watersheds and states.30
Under the appropriation system, the amount of water one may use is a
fixed quantity, measured by the beneficial purpose for which the water is to
be used; sufficient water will be allowed to fulfill the purpose of the
appropriation.3 1 The law is based solely on priority of use and does not
attempt to benefit all users of the watercourse. For these reasons, prior
appropriation law is uniquely suited to the arid states, where great
quantities of water must be diverted for both irrigation and domestic
purposes.
Priority of appropriative rights attaches upon perfection of the
appropriation-that is, when the appropriated water is actually put to a
beneficial use.32 Relative priorities between appropriators of the same
watercourse, however, are determined by comparison of the dates on
which the,initial steps toward appropriation occurred.33 Thus, if an
appropriation is perfected with due diligence, its priority "relates back!
3 4
to the date of the initial diversion, potentially giving rise to rights superior
to those created by an appropriation perfected earlier but commenced
later.35
Finally, because the right to use water does not run with the land, it is
transferable. 36 The right is of indefinite duration and lasts as long as the
water is being put to beneficial use.37
B. The Implied Reservation Doctrine
The implied reservation doctrine may be summarized as follows: If, at
the time the United States reserves a part of the public domain for a federal
purpose that will ultimately require water, the government intends to
reserve unappropriated water for that purpose, then sufficient water to
fulfill that purpose is reserved for use by the federal government. There are
two major effects of the doctrine: (1) when the water is eventually put to
use, the right of the United States will be superior to any private rights in
the water acquired after the date of the reservation, thus impairing or
29. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 29-30.
30. Id. at 29.
31. Id. at 30.
32. Id. at 33.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 30-31.
36. Id. at 32-33.
37. The creation of a water right in New Mexico under the Colorado Doctrine requires an intent
to appropriate, notice of appropriation, compliance with state laws, a diversion of the water from t
natural stream and its application, with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable time, to beneficial
use. See F. TRELEASE. CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 1974).
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destroying the private rights without compensation for the exercise of the
reserved right; and (2) the federal use is not subject to state laws regulating
the appropriation and use of water. Additionally, application of the
doctrine is apparently not restricted to water arising on the reserved land.
For example, in Winiers v. United States38 and Arizona v. California,39 the
Court applied the doctrine although the water originated upstream from
the reservation.40
1. Early Western Water Law
Before the evolution of the implied reservation doctrine it was
generally believed that, except for the power of the United States over
navigable waterways based on the federal power to regulate commerce,
water law was exclusively the province of the states.4' Prior to the
enunciation of that doctrine in 1907,42 the western states were believed to
have acquired any proprietary interests that the federal government had
had.
Several statutes appeared to grant the states the power to regulate
nonnavigable water rights. The first of these was the Act of 186643 as
amended in 1870.44 This Act with its amendments recognized the vested
appropriative rights of those who had settled the western lands before later
riparian owners and federal patentees.4 5 Additionally, the Desert Land Act
of 187746 stated in part:
[All1 surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use,
together with the water of all, [sic] lakes, rivers and other sources of water
supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free
for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and
manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. ...
This Act was interpreted, in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co.,48 as severing all unappropriated water on public
lands from the land itself. This severance was possible because the
government, as owner of the public domain, possessed the power to
dispose of the land and water, either together or separately. The Court held
that this severing of the land and water rights made it possible for a state to
adopt either the law of prior appropriation or the riparian system, because
38. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
39. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
40. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 109.
41. Moses, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine-From 1866 Through Eagle County, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 221, 227 (1975).
42. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
43. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251.
44. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217.
45. See also notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
46. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
47. Id. § 1.
48. 295 U.S. 142 (1935). See also notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
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rights to the land did not include common-law riparian rights. Thus, it
would seem that the states had sole power over the determination of all
nonnavigable water rights. Later case law, however, indicated that the
United States did not give up control of unappropriated nonnavigable
waters on reserved lands. Instead these waters were said to be free from any
appropriation under state law.
2. The Theoretical Basis of the Implied Reservation Doctrine
There are several theories that state the basis for the implied
reservation doctrine. It has been argued that the doctrine, as foreshadowed
in United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.,49 is based on a
"pure and simple statement of the supremacy doctrine."50 Rio Grande
dealt with the proposed building of a dam on the Rio Grande River. The
irrigation company, which was acting pursuant to state law, claimed that
although portions of the Rio Grande were navigable, it was not navigable
at or above the place at which the dam was to be built.51 The United States
claimed that the river was navigable at this point and that the construction
of the dam would impede the navigability of the river below the dam.52 In
holding that the dam could not be built even though the stream was not
navigable at that point, the Court noted that while a state had the power to
change from a riparian to an appropriation system, its power to
appropriate water was subject to two limitations:
First, that in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands
bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second,
that it is limited by the superior power of the General Government to secure
the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the
United States. In other words, the jurisdiction of the General Government
over interstate commerce and its natural highways vests in that Government
the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the
navigable water courses of the country even against any state action."
Professor Trelease has argued that this and later cases 54 actually
dealing with the reservation doctrine were based on the supremacy
clause.55 Arguably, under the federal government's general powers to
administer its lands, the states are prevented from interfering with the
exercise of these general powers. Professor Trelease maintains that the
reservation doctrine does not depend on
49. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
50. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 147k.
51. 174 U.S. at 693.
52. Id. at 692.
53. Id. at 703.
54. These cases are Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) and Arizona v. Californifi, 373
U.S. 546 (1963). In both cases the Court actually applied the reservation doctrine.
55. U.S. CoNsT. art VI, cl. 2.
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theories of federal ownership of water, faulty interpretations of statutes and
false history. The results would have been the same if the Acts of 1866 and
1877 had never been enacted, and nothing would change if those acts were
repealed today. Reserved water rights stem from the supremacy clause and
the need for water to carry out federal functions. 6
The "faulty interpretations" that Professor Trelease referred to are
those that have, in his opinion, evolved due to the belief on the part of
many commentators that the property clause5 7 is the basis of the implied
reservation doctrine. The theory is that the federal government, as owner
of the Oregon Territory, the Louisiana Purchase, the Texas Annexation,
the Mexican Cession, and the Gadsden Purchase, possesses the power to
dispose of both the land and water on those tracts. 8 At one time the United
States owned almost all the land, and the water appurtenant to it, in the
seventeen western states. But, the argument goes, the states, by the mere
admission to statehood, no more acquired title to nonnavigable waters
than they acquired title to the public land.59 Consequently, it follows that
the United States is still the owner of that public land and water
appurtenant thereto, unless the United States has disposed of it.60
In the Acts of 1866 and 1870 the United States recognized the vested
rights of those already using the water. Under the Desert Land Act of 1877
as interpreted by the Supreme Court,61 Congress recognized that the states
have the power to choose to use either the riparian or prior appropriation
systems of law.62 The Act also provided, however, that any surplus
unappropriated water, and all lakes, rivers, and sources of water supply on
public lands were to remain free for public use. The "severance" of waters
from the public domain, however, did not mean that federal ownership of
the water was "conveyed" to the states. Thus, according to the proprietary
theory, the basis of the implied reservation doctrine is the continued
ownership of land by the federal government.
Under the proprietary theory, when the United States reserves a part
of the public domain for some purpose of its own, it reserves
unappropriated waters sufficient to fulfill that purpose. The reserved water
so withheld is the property of the United States, and the government can
56. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 1471.
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3.
58. TRELEA SE, supra note 5, at 111. The states created out of these tracts are Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See Morreale, Federal-State
Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuTGER L
Ray. 423, 431 nAl (1966) [hereinafter cited as Federal-State Conflicts].
59. See generally Federal-State Conflicts, supra note 58.
60. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
61. California Ore. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
62. Note, however, that use of the Desert Land Act of 1877 as a basis for the implied reservation
doctrine may limit the doctrine to those states to which the Act specifically applies. These states are:
California, Colorado, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 43 U.S.C. § 323 (1976).
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put it to use without compliance with state law. An appropriator
complying with state law cannot obtain title to waler so reserved, and his
right applies only to the surplus water, if any, remaining after the federal
right is satisfied. The amount of water that will ultimately be needed on the
reserved lands may be used in the meantime by an appropriator who
complies with the state law; but if the water is later put to use by the
government, it takes no property from the temporary user and owes him
no compensation.
63
The starting point for the development of the doctrine under the
proprietary theory, like that of the supremacy theory, is the case of United
States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.64 The Court's language in
that case, characterizing the United States as "owner of lands bordering on
[the] stream, ' 65 has been read by at least one commentator as giving "aid
and comfort" to the federal government's claim based on a proprietary
right.66 This language is said to refute arguments based on the 1866 and
1877 Acts that the states have exclusive control over their water
resources.
67
The difficulty in reaching a conclusion concerning the theoretical
basis of the doctrine is due to the limited number of cases in which the
doctrine has been applied. Regardless of the controversy surrounding its
theoretical basis, however, the cases in which the doctrine has been applied
can be examined to gain a basic understanding of the doctrine and its
application.
3. Case Law Development of the Implied Reservation Doctrine
Although the implied reservation doctrine was foreshadowed in the
Rio Grande case, it was first explicitly articulated in Winters v. United
States.68 That case was brought to restrain the appellants from damming
or diverting the Milk River, which flows into the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana. The reservation had been created in 1888, one
year before Montana was admitted to the Union. The Court held that on
the day that the reservation was established, the United States had
impliedly reserved as much water as would be necessary for use by the
Indians throughout the years. Thus, any private appropriative rights to the
waters of the Milk River acquired under state law after that day would be
inferior to rights concerning water use by the reservation. Appellants had
argued that the United States Government was not exempt from state law
and could not therefore reserve water for the reservation. The Court
answered, however, that it was not the intent of Congress to allow the state
63. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 114-15.
64. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
65. Id. at 703. See also text accompanying note 25 supra.
66. Federal-State Conflicts, supra note 58, at 434.
67. See notes 37-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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of Montana to destroy the reservation one year after its creation by
withholding from it the water needed by its inhabitants.
While Winters shed little additional light on the basis of the
69doctrine, the case did establish the power of the federal government, at
least in the case of Indian reservations, to reserve by implication any water
that may be necessary for their continued viability. In fact, this doctrine
was considered for years to be uniquely applicable to Indian reservations.7
It was not until later that the Court decided that the doctrine was
applicable to other reserved federal lands.7'
The power of the federal government, regardless of state law, to dam
water in nonnavigable streams adjacent to federally reserved non-Indian
land was first postulated by the Supreme Court in Federal Power
Commission v. Oregon,72 the "Pelton Dam" case. In an earlier case, First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,73 the
Supreme Court had held that it was unnecessary for an applicant for a
federal license to build a power project on a navigable stream to comply
with state law. Section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act, 74 according to the
Court, only requires the Federal Power Commission [FPC] to look to state
law as one factor to consider in evaluating applications for licenses. If state
law conflicts with the Power Act, the latter prevails.
The Pelton Dam case also dealt with the licensing powers of the FPC
but, unlike First Iowa, Pelton Dam concerned a dam being built on a
nonnavigable stream on reserved land of the United States. The State of
Oregon challenged the authority of the Commission to issue the license
and questioned the adequacy of provisions approved by the FPC for the
protection of anadromous fish. The Court stated that, as in First Iowa, the
FPC had jurisdiction to issue the license. But the Court added that in
Pelton Dam the Commission's jurisdiction was based on "ownership or
control by the United States of the reserved lands on which the licensed
project is to be located,"" while in First Iowa, the Commission's
jurisdiction was based on the United States' power over navigable
waterways. In answer to Oregon's argument that the Acts of 1866 and 1870
and the Desert Land Act of 1877 were express delegations of power to the
69. The Winters Court relied to a significant extent on language from Rio Grande, which, as
discussed earlier in the text, is the seminal case upon which both supremacy clause and propertyclause
theorists base their claims regarding the constitutional foundation for the implied reservation doctrine.
See generally notes 49-67 and accompanying text supra. See also note 70 infra.
70. Winters can also be understood as a case dealing with the United States treaty power on the
theory that in ceding their lands to the United States, the Indians impliedly reserved all water needed
for their reservations.
71. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See notes 72-85 and accompanying
text infra.
72. Id.
73. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 802(B) (1976).
75. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 442 (1955).
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states, the Court held that those acts referred only to "public lands" that
could be sold to private citizens. The land in question, the Court
continued, was a "reservation" to which the Acts were not applicable.7
6
The Court also sought to avoid the duplication of regulatory control that
would occur if the states were allowed to veto the license." Thus, for the
first time, by stressing the proprietary interests of the United States, the
Court stated that the implied reservation doctrine applied to federal
reserved land other than Indian reservations.
The first actual allocation of "reserved" water for non-Indian
reservations came in Arizona v. Califoknia.78 That case adjudicated the
rights of five states in the Colorado Basin79 to the waters of the navigable
Colorado River. The United States intervened to protect its water rights in
several types of reserved lands. The Court held that the Secretary of the
Interior had been granted power by Congress 0 to distribute water from the
Boulder Canyon Project and that the Secretary was not bound to follow
state law.81 The Court found this power to "regulate navigable waters" not
only in the Commerce Clause,82 but also in the Property Clause. Relying
on Winters, 3 the Court reaffirmed the ability of the federal government to
reserve water for an Indian reservation for which the United States was
claiming reserved water rights.8 4 It also extended the doctrine to other
types of federal reservations, including the Gila National Forest, the
federal reservation in question in United States v. New Mexico.85
II. United States v. New Mexico
A. Facts
The Rio Mimbres River, which was the center of controversy in the
New Mexico litigation, originates in the highlands of the Gila National
76. Id. at 448.
77. Id. at 445, citing First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152,
177-79 (1946).
78. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
79. Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.
80. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976). The project consisted of a series of
federally-funded dams along the Colorado River in the states listed in note 79 supra.
81. 373 U.S. at 586.
82. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. 373 U.S. at 597-98.
84. The Court stated that the quantity of water an Indian reservation could withdraw would be
that amount which was enough so that the "practicably irrigatable" lands could be put to use. Tile
Court did not stipulate a quantity for any other types of reserved lands. Id. at 598-600.
85.
After Arizona v. California held that the Gila National Forest has reserved water rights, the
Forest Service revised its Manual of Procedures which guides its field personnel. They are
now instructed to regard all water uses by others on the forest as"permissive," to scrupulosly
avoid complying with state law when using water on reserved lards, though notifying state
agencies, and to just as scrupulously adhere to state law or water uses on acquired lands,
TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 86-87, citing WHEATLEY & CORKER, STUDY OF TiE DEVELOI'MUINT,
MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 203-11 (1969).
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Forest and flows generally southward through the forest and past more
than fifty miles of privately owned land. The river provides water for both
irrigation and mining on these lands.
This suit was initiated in 1966 as a private action to enjoin allegedly
illegal diversions of the river. In 1970 the State of New Mexico filed a
complaint-in-intervention,86 seeking a general stream adjudication to
determine the exact rights of each user of the Mimbres and its tributaries.
The complaint named as defendants all parties claiming any interest in and
use of the waters of the Rio Mimbres, including the United States. 7
The United States claimed reserved rights for minimum instream
flows 8 and for recreational, stockwatering, and "fish" purposes within the
Gila National Forest. The matter was referred to a special master by the
trial court to determine the rights of the parties. The master found, inter
alia,89 that specified amounts of water were being used in the forest for
stockwatering and that a minimum instream flow of 6.0 cubic feet per
second was being used for "fish" purposes and recreation. The master's
conclusions of law supported the United States' claim to this water. The
State of New Mexico objected to the master's report.9°
The New Mexico District Court held that the United States, in setting
aside the Gila National Forest from other public lands, reserved the use of
such water "as may be necessary for the purposes for which [the land was]
withdrawn," but decided that these purposes did not include recreation,
aesthetics, wildlife-preservation, or cattle grazing. The United States made
an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, 9' and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
86. The motion was filed pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-15 (1978).
87. The United States was joined pursuant to the McCarran Amendment of 1970, 43 U.S.C. §
666 (1976). The amendment allows the United States to be sued in state courts when government-
owned water rights are at issue. The purpose of the Act was to encourage judicial efficiency by
consolidating all water rights adjudication into a single forum. For an excellent discussion of the
possible effects of state-court adjudication of federal reserved water rights, see Abrams, Reserved
Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River
Decision, 30 STAN. L. REa. 1111 (1978).
88. "Minimum instream flow" means maintaining a certain minimum amount of ter flowing
in the stream bed. Because the prior appropriation system of water law frequently requires an actual
diversion for the appropriation to be perfected, as does New Mexico lawsee State v. Miranda, 83 N.M.
443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972), it may be, at least for the present, impossible under New Mexico law for the
state to appropriate water to guarantee minimum instream flows. The inability to appropriate water for
minimum instream flows may, therefore, prevent state or federal agencies from maintaining streams
for uses such as fish and wildlife preservation and recreation. Under New Mexico law, however,
recreation is a beneficial use of water. See Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 218,
182 P.2d 421,428 (1945). Thus, the maintenance of instreav flows for recreational uses may meet the
beneficial use requirement of New Mexico appropriation law (N.M. CoNsT. art. 16,§§ 1, 2), though this
is inconsistent with the diversion requirement. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Note,
Appropriation By the State of Mininn Flows in New Mexico Streants, 15 NAT. REsoURCas J. 809
(1975).
89. The Special Master also found that the United States was diverting 6.9 acre-fect per annum
of water for domestic-residential use, 6.5 acre-feet for road use, 3.23 acre-feet for domestic-recreational
use, and .10 of an acre-foot for "wildlife" purposes. 438 U.S. at 703.
90. The objection was made pursuant to N.M.R. Civ. P. 53(eX2).
91. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
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Supreme Court of New Mexico had properly applied principles of federal
law.
B. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Court did not perceive the issue to be whether Congress had the
power to reserve water for the national forest-such power was clearly
present. Instead, the issue was one of intent-how much water had
Congress intended to reserve for the forest?
The question of "amount," however, was difficult because of the
failure of Congress to state specifically the amount of water to be reserved
for national forests. This silence, as the Court indicated, would be of little
significance to a case which concerned an area where water was plentiful.
Due to the aridity of the western states, however, and the vast land
holdings of the federal government, the question of the amount of water
the federal government may reserve becomes a very important one, not
only for the federal government, but also for private water users and for the
states where the reservations are located.92
This question is also crucial because of what the Court recognized as
traditional deference of Congress to state water law.93 Because the implied
reservation doctrine is a departure from this traditional deference, the
Court endeavored to use it sparingly. To this end, and because Congress
had not specifically stated the amount of water to be reserved for a national
forest, the Court carefully examined the purposes for which a national
forest could be created.
The Court created a test for determining Congress' purpose, or
"implied intent," in establishing a national forest. Under this test, it is first
necessary to determine whether "it is reasonable to conclude, even in the
face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas, that
the United States intended to reserve the necessary water., 94 Only when the
primary purpose of the land reservation would be entirely frustrated
without the reservation of water will an intent to reserve water be
implied,95 and then only "that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more. 9 6 The Court went on to create a
92. The vast land holdings of the federal government in the western states were described in the
following statement of the Court:
The percentage of federally-owned land (excluding Indian reservations and other trust
properties) in the Western States . . . average[s] . . . about 46% [in each state], Of the
land in the State of New Mexico, 33.6%is federally owned. . . . Because federal
reservations are normally found in the uplands of the Western States rather than the
flatlands, the percentage of water flow originating in or flowing through the reservations is
even more impressive. More than 60% of the average annual water yield in the II Western
States is from federal reservations. . . In the Rio Grande water-resource region, where the
Rio Mimbres lies, 77% of the average runoff originates on federal reservations.
438 U.S. at 699 n.3.
93. Id. at 702.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 700.
96. Id., quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
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category of "secondary" uses of the national forest. When water is only
valuable for such a secondary use, the United States would have to acquire
it "in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. 9
7
Thus, the Court has set up a bifurcated method for obtaining water rights
on federally reserved lands, depending on whether the purpose is
"primary" or "secondary."
In applying this test to the facts of the case, the Court affirmed the
decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, holding that Congress had
implicitly intended to reserve water necessary to fulfill the purposes for
which the Gila National Forest was created. Those purposes, however, did
not include recreation, aesthetics, wildlife-preservation, or cattle grazing,
which the Court characterized as secondary rather than primary
purposes.98 Under the Organic Administration Act of 189799 the Court
found two primary purposes for which a national forest can be created: to
conserve water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the
people. 1' ° That Act provides:
No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for
the use and necessities of citizens of the United States; but it is not the purpose
or intent of these provisions, or of said section, [the Creative Act of 1891 to
authorize the inclusion therein of lands more valuable for the mineral therein,
or for agricultural purposes, than for forest purposes.1
0 2
According to the Court, the United States has expressed an intent to
appropriate water under the implied reservation doctrine only for the two
primary purposes listed in the Organic Administration Act.
An alternative interpretation offered by the United States was that the
Act stated three purposes for which a national forest could be created: the
two purposes recognized by the Court, which are to furnish continuous
supplies of timber and to conserve water flows, and a third, broader
purpose, to protect the forest. 10 3 Under this interpretation, the United
States contended that Congress intended "to reserve minimum instream
flows for aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation purposes," and for
stockwatering.'0 4
Other sections of the Act itself tend to indicate a broader purpose than
97. 438 U.S. at 702.
98. Id. at 706-08.
99. Ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-78, 479-82, 551 (1976).
100. 438 U.S. at 707.
101. Creative Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976). TheAct gave the President authority
to reserve public lands as national forests.
102. Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976).
103. 438 U.S. at 707-08 n.14.
104. Id. at 705. Specifically, the United States contended that water could be reserved for the
following forest purposes: (1) maintenance of an assured flow if two cubic feet per second at three
separate points on the stream within the national forest for protection from fire and erosion and for the
protection of an endangered species of trout; (2) for limited recreational use incidental to hunting,
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the Court recognized. For example, one section authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to "make such rules and regulations and establish such
service as will insure the objects of such reservation, namely, to regulate
their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction."'' 5 The "occupancy and use" language appears to con-
template purposes other than the two recognized by the Supreme Court.
The Act also authorized the entry onto the forest lands by anyone "for all
proper and lawful purposes,"'' 0 6 which also supports the contention that
water may be reserved for national forests for more than the two limited
purposes set forth by the Court.
The Court rejected this interpretation, however, and held that the
Organic Administration Act only enunciated two purposes for which
national forests could be created.'0 7 The "improve and protect the forest"
phrase of the Act,'0 8 relied on by the United States and the dissent in
support of their argument for a third, broader purpose for national forests,
was explained away by the Court by reading additional words into the
statute, interpreting this phrase as being only an alternative way of saying
"for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to
furnish a continuous supply of timber."'10 9
The Court justified this interpretation in several ways. First, it looked
to the legislative history of the Act, including the congressional debate at
the time the Act was passed and administrative regulations made near the
time of its passage. Second, the Court compared the Act to other
legislation dealing with federal reservations. Third, the Courtjustified this
interpretation through its reading of the Multiple-Usc Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960."10 Finally, the Court noted and relied on what it termed
"traditional deference" to state water law.
1. The Legislative History of the Organic Administration Act of 1897
In order to fully understand the congressional debates on the Organic
Administration Act, one must recognize the historical context in which the
debates were held. At the urging of conservationists, the Creative Act of
18911. was enacted in the hope that it would halt damaging logging
camping, and hiking; and (3) for consumption by stock. Petitioner's Brieffor Certiorari, United States
v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
In reference to the first purpose it should be noted that the master termed the purpose as a "fish"
purpose and refused to amend the language of his report to include the other intended purposes. Tie
state courts also refused to allow such an amendment. Id. This is significant because a stated purpose of
the United States for requesting the minimum instream flow was to protect the forest from fire and
erosion, which were purposes contemplated by the Congress in enacting the Organic Administration
Act. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1976).
107. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
108. For the text of the Act, see text accompanying note 102 supra.
109. 438 U.S. at 707 n.14.
110. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1976).
111. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103.
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practices and be "used to save the best of the remaining public timberlands
for controlled management,""12 although the Act itself did not set out a
specific purpose. The Act merely authorized the president to reserve public
forest land without giving any specific guidelines.
In February 1897, in response to an unpublished report of the
National Forest Commission urging strong conservation measures,
President Cleveland arbitrarily established forest reserves in seven states
totalling approximately twenty-one million acres of forest land. Much of
this land had been settled and was being used as homesteads and for
mining and lumbering. Because it was generally believed that this
reservation prohibited all domestic and commercial use of these lands, the
storm of protest that arose was swift and angry." 3 This protest
significantly influenced the debate on the Organic Administration Act.
Although many of the comments of the supporters of the bill were aimed at
reassuring western Congressmen that the forests were not to be set aside
for nonuse, as those Congressmen thought President Cleveland had done,
these same supporters also had conservation motives.
The New Mexico Court relied heavily on these reassuring statements
by the bill's sponsors in support of its theory that the Organic
Administration Act provided only a twofold purpose for the creation of
national forests. In particular, the Court relied on the statements of
Congressman McRae, one of the bill's sponsors and a sponsor of similar
earlier legislation: "The purpose, therefore, of this bill is to maintain
favorable forest conditions, without excluding the use of these reservations
for other purposes. They are not parks set aside for nonuse, but have been
established for economic reasons."' 1
4
There were, however, other comments by supporters of the bill that
tend to support the contrary position-that the Act does have broader
purposes. For example, in the paragraph immediately following the one
cited by the Court, Congressman McRae stated that the Act was necessary
to "prescribe the manner and method by which the timber growing
thereon, the mineral contained therein, the water power furnished by them
and the pasturage within the same shall be used, so as not to injure or
destroy the primary objects for which they [the forests] were establish-
ed."' 5 Additionally, another supporter of the bill, Congressman Lacey,
who was an "Easterner," suggested that one purpose of the bill was to
prevent the people of the West from doing as foolish things as the people of
the East once did and which they now regret. The people of the East destroyed
the salmon in the Connecticutt River, just as to-day the salmon are being
destroyed in the Columbia River.
The people of the East destroyed the timber of the Adirondacks, just as
112. P. GATES, HisTORy OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEvELOPhEN-r 566 (1968) (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 568-69.
114. 438 U.S. at 708.
115. 30 CONG. REc. 966 (1897) (emphasis added).
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to-day the timber is being destroyed in Montana and other places in the
West.'
16
Thus, arguments can be made supporting either interpretation of the
Act. It is apparent from the congressional debates that the major
preoccupation of western congressmen was ensuring that the Act did not
result in setting aside the forests for complete nonuse, as they believed the
presidential proclamation had done. Supporters of the bill, who were
concerned about passing an act to control timbercutting for purposes of
conserving the forests and for flood control, were preoccupied with
reassuring the skeptics that the Act would not have the same effect as
Cleveland's proclamation. Therefore, any argument concerning the
purpose of the Act based on a reading of the record of these debates is at
best a makeweight.
The dissent also found this argument unpersuasive. The issue of the
purposes for which the forests were created was the sole point of
disagreement between the dissent and majority opinions. Citing the
"improve and protect the forest" language of the Act, the dissent found it
hard to believe that Congress intended the forests to be
the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court. In my view, the
forests consist of the birds, animals, and fish-the wildlife-that inhabit
them. . . .I therefore would hold that the United States is entitled to so
much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the forests, as well as the
plants.'1
7
Although the dissent noted that normally the water flow necessary to
maintain the watershed would be sufficient to protect the wildlife, the
opinion expressed concern that in exceptional situations the United States
would be powerless to reserve additional water for this purpose. The
dissent was concerned, for example, that an upstream appropriator could
divert so much water that the forest wildlife, including life in the streams,
would be endangered." 8 Seeing the wildlife as part of the forest that was to
be "preserved," the dissent felt the United States had intended to reserve
water for such purposes if necessary.
Additionally, the Court made reference to administrative regulations
as confirming these two limited purposes for which national forests may be
established. The Court cited a 1913 report of the Chief Forester as support
for this proposition." 9 Other regulations, however, illustrate that forest
administrators felt that forests were established for broader purposes. A
1902 Forest Reserve Manual, for example, stated that "all law abiding
people are permitted to travel in forest reserves for the purpose of
116. Id. at 981.
117. 438 U.S. at 719.
118. Id. at 724 n.5.
119. Id. at 709 n.16.
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prospecting, surveying, to go to and from their own lands or claims, and
for pleasure and recreation."
1 20
Therefore, in light of the varying conclusions that can be drawn from
the legislative and administrative history that the Court cited in support of
its interpretation of the Organic Administration Act, reliance on these
sources is dissatisfying and unpersuasive.
2. Other Legislation Regulating Federally Reserved Lands
The Court emphasized what it believed to be the narrow purposes for
which national forests are to be reserved, by contrasting the language of
the Organic Administration Act with the "broader" language of legislation
establishing and regulating other federal reservations. 2'
First, the Court discussed the statute authorizing the establishment of
national parks, which specifically states that its purpose"is to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same ...unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations."' 22 It next discussed an act sl5ecifically providing for
fixed water levels in the streams and lakes of the Superior National
Forest.2 3 The Court also discussed legislation specifically authorizing the
establishment, with the consent of the appropriate state legislature, of fish
and game sanctuaries within national forests. 2 4 Finally, the Court noted
that in establishing Yosemite National Park in 1890,12 Congress explicitly
instructed the Secretary of the Interior to provide for the protection of fish
and game. So, the Court reasoned, if Congress had intended national
forests in general to be established for these types of uses it would have
specifically provided such in the Organic Administration Act as it did in
the other acts. 26 In addition, the Court held that if Congress had meant the
national forests to be used as fish and game sanctuaries (or for other similar
purposes), with the resulting authority to reserve water under the implied
reservation doctrine to maintain instream flows, it would not have been
necessary to adopt legislation establishing fish and game sanctuaries in
national forests and fixed water levels in Superior National Forest.17 In its
analysis of this legislation, however, the Court assumed that Congress
carefully evaluated the Organic Act and, on the basis of that evaluation,
found it necessary to enact specific legislation due to the limited purposes
120. GENERAL LAND OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OFTHE INTERIOR, FOREST RESERVE MANUAL FOR FoRS?
OFFICERS 8 (1902).
121. See 438 U.S. at 708-11.
122. National Park Service Act of 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (codified in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
123. Act of July 10, 1930, 16 U.S.C. § 577b (1976).
124. Act of March 10, 1934, ch. 54, 48 Stat. 400.
125. Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1263, 26 Stat. 650.
126. 438 U.S. at 709-11.
127 Id.
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for which a forest could be created under the Organic Act. This assumption
is erroneous.
In fact, it appears that Congress has assumed that the Organic
Administration Act provides for more than the two narrow purposes that
the Court suggested. Apparently, Congress has assumed that national
forests can be used for a variety of purposes and has enacted legislation to
appropriate funds for and to regulate the use of forest resources in a
number of ways. For example, Congress has repeatedly authorized
expenditures for the protection of fish and game in the national forests, 128
authorized expenditures of money for range improvement, 129 provided for
the regulation of grazing on national forest land,1 30 authorized the use and
occupation of forest land for hotels, resorts, summer homes, and other
commercial facilities,' 3' and authorized expenditures for research to
promote the production, protection, and use of forest resources, including
the improvement of rangeland, the improvement of food and habitat of
wildlife, and management of the forest lands for outdoor recreation.13 2 It
appears from these acts, then, that Congress has assumed that national
forests can be used for a wide range of purposes-purposes that, according
to the Court's holding, Congress did not intend to be supported by
reserving water under the implied reservation doctrine because they are at
best "secondary" purposes. Whether water may be reserved for these
secondary purposes is problematic. The question is not answered,
however, by the Court's reliance on the legislation previously discussed.
Such legislation is no more persuasive than that cited in support of a
broader interpretation of the Organic Act. Again, the Court's reliance on
these statutes seems to be little more than a makeweight and is
unpersuasive.
3. The Multiple- Use Sustained- Yield Act
The New Mexico Court also examined the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960,133 which provides:
It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and
shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
wildlife and fish purposes. The purposes of [this Act] are declared to be
supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national
forests were established as set forth in section 475 [the Organic Administra-
tion Act] of this title. 34
128. Sundry Civil Appropriations Act, 30 Stat. 1095 (1899); 33 Stat. 872 (1905); 34 Stat, 683
(1906); 34 Stat. 1269 (1907).
129. Act of April 24, 1950, 16 U.S.C. § 580h (1976).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976).
131. Act of July 28, 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1976).
132. Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-788, 76 Stat. 806.
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1976).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
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After its analysis of the Multiple-Use Act, the Court agreed with the
Supreme Court of New Mexico and concluded that although the Act was
"intended to broaden the purposes for which national forests had
previously been administered, .. .Congress did not intend to thereby
expand the reserved rights of the United States.' 35 Thus, even though the
Court conceded that the Multiple-Use Act expanded the purposes for
which forests could be administered, due to the traditional deference by
Congress to state water law, the purposes in the Act were only secondary
purposes. The two purposes that the Court found in the Organic
Administration Act, namely to conserve water flows and to furnish a
continuous supply of timber, are primary purposes,13 one of which must
be present for the reservation of water for a national forest to be valid.
137
These "secondary" purposes enumerated in the Multiple-Use Act are
purely supplemental to and may not derogate from the attainment of the
two primary purposes.'38
The United States did not argue that the Multiple-Use Act broadened
the purposes for which a national forest could be established. Instead, it
contended that the Act recognized purposes that had always existed,
pursuant to its broad reading of the Organic Administration Act. 139 This
interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the Multiple-Use
Act. In the House Report on the Act it was noted that:
Through the years by a number of congressional enactments, including
appropriations for carrying out specific activities and functions, through
court decisions, and through policy directives and statements, the
management of the national forests under the principle of multiple use has
been thoroughly recognized and accepted. The application of the principle of
sustained-yield management has also been thoroughly established. It is thus
desirable that the Secretary of Agriculture have a directive to administer the
national forests under the dual principles of multiple use and sustained
yield. 1
40
135. 438 U.S. at 713 (citation omitted).
136. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
137. 438 U.S. at 714-15.
138. Id. at 714. This language was taken by the Court from the House Report accompanyingthe
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act which was worded as follows:
[Congress wanted to] make it clear that the declaration of congressional policy that the
national forests are established and shall be administered for the purposes enumerated is
supplemental to, but is not in derogation of, the purposes of improving and protecting the
forest or for securing favorable conditions of water flows and to furnish a continuous supply
of timber as set out in the cited provision of the Act ofJune 4, 1897. Thus in any establishment
of a national foresta purpose set out in the 1897 Act must be present but there mayalsoexist
one or more of the additional purposes listed in the bill.
H.R. R P. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE Co.NG. & AD. NEws 2377,
2380. Thus, the interpretation of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act depends to a large degree on
what interpretation is given to the Organic Administration Act of 1897-which the Court has narrowly
interpreted to embody only the two purposes of conserving water flows and furnishing continuous
supplies of timber.
139. For a further discussion of this argument, see note 104 and accompanying text mtpra.
140. H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE Co.OG. & AD.
NEws 2377, 2378.
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The quantity of legislation that Congress has enacted to appropriate funds
for and regulate the various uses of the forests enumerated in the Multiple-
Use Act also supports this construction of the Act.'
41
If the Court had accepted this interpretation, the federal government
could have appropriated enough water to fulfill these various purposes
under the implied reservation doctrine. Instead, according to the Court,
Congress intended to reserve water under the reservation doctrine, only for
the purposes of furnishing continuous supplies of timber and conserving
water flows, but for none of the other purposes enumerated in the
Multiple-Use Act. This is an odd result since Congress, in the Multiple-Use
Act, specifically recognized these additional purposes for which national
forests can be established.
This result is even stranger in light of language in the House Report
which declared that none of the uses enumerated had priority over any
other forest use:
One of the basic concepts of multiple use is that all of these resources in
general are entitled to equal consideration, but in particular or localized areas
relative values of the various resources will be recognized. The order in which
resources are listed in the bill is not to be construed as indicating any priority
of one of the resources over another. The listing is merely
alphabetical. . . . In one locality timber use might dominate; in another
locality use of the range by domestic livestock; in another outdoor recreation
or wildlife might dominate. . . . But no resource would be given a statutory
priority over the others.1
42
It seems inconsistent that Congress would recognize such additional
purposes without intending to appropriate water for these purposes in the
same manner that it provides water for purposes previously recognized in
the Organic Administration Act. This, however, is the result under the
Court's interpretation. Thus, in the future, when the federal government
needs water for a national forest for purposes other than furnishing
continuous supplies of timber and conserving water flows, it will be
required to obtain it in the same way that any other water user would do so
under state law or through eminent domain.
The Multiple-Use Act can also be interpreted as broadening the
purposes for which national forests may be administered after 1960. Under
this view, water rights would vest under the implied reservation doctrine at
the time Congress expanded the purposes for which national forests may
be used-in the case of the Multiple-Use Act, 1960.14' The federal
government's water rights for these purposes would be subject only to
previously-vested water rights in other users.
141. See notes 124-30 and accompanying text supra.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CoDu CoNo. & At),
NEWS 2377, 2379.
143. For a general discussion of this interpretation of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, see
Abrams, supra note 87, at 1135-39.
[Vol. 40: 729
IMPLIED RESER VA TION DOCTRINE
In dicta the Court recognized this argument 144 but adhered to its
previous stand that Congress only intended that national forests be created
for the two purposes that the Court recognized in the Organic
Administration Act. The Court stated that in the Multiple-Use Act,
Congress intended only to expand the purposes for which national forests
could be administered. The Court failed, however, to give a definitive
answer to the question whether the United States had water rights under
the implied reservation doctrine for these "expanded" purposes. Instead,
the Court said only that even if the United States had such water rights,
they would be subordinate to any vested rights obtained under state law
prior to 1960.14' Although the United States did not raise this argument, it
appears that the Court did recognize it and would have applied this theory
to the facts of New Mexico had it considered the argument valid.
Apparently the Court did not so consider it.
The New Mexico decision leaves unanswered the question whether
the Multiple-Use Act authorized a broader application of the doctrine of
reserved water rights for national forests created after 1960.146 It would be
inconsistent, however, for the Act to authorize broader reserved water
rights for forests created after 1960 but not for forests existing before that
date. Congress does have the power to expand the purposes for which a
forest may be used. As the Court stated, the issue is one of intent. It is
possible, of course, that Congress intended to create this broader water
right for forests created after 1960. But this intent is not apparent from the
language of the Act or the legislative history which emphasizes past,
present, and future uses of national forests.147 It would seem, therefore,
that the Court in the future will insist that Congress did not mean to
expand water rights under the reservation doctrine, even for national
forests created after enactment of the Multiple-Use Act.
4. Deference to State Law
Throughout the majority opinion the Court emphasized the
traditional deference of Congress to state water law. The implied
reservation doctrine, the Court said, was built on the inference that
Congress intended to reserve water to carry out the purposes for which
public land was reserved. Therefore, the doctrine had to be narrowly
construed as an exception to Congress' otherwise explicit deference to
state water law. 14
8
Although it is true, as the Court stated, that many congressional
enactments defer to state law, especially state water law, it is not
necessarily true that the Court's interpretation of these laws has been
144. 438 U.S. at 713-14 n.21.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 715 n.22.
147. For this language see text accompanying notes 134, 140, 142 supra.
148. 438 U.S. at 715.
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especially deferential to state law. The Court first noted that courts
traditionally have carefully examined the specific purposes for which the
land had been reserved and then questioned whether these purposes would
be entirely defeatedwithout the reserved water. 49 In light of this assertion
by the Court, it is enlightening to examine the Court's reasoning on this
issue in previous cases dealing with the implied reservation doctrine.
Federal Power Commission v. Oregon'50 was the first case in which
the Court applied the implied reservation doctrine to federal reservation
other than Indian reservations. That case held that the FPC could issue
licenses for a power project located on a federal reservation even though
the project would not qualify for licensing under state law. The decision
emphasized that under the facts of the case, Oregon law would have
"vetoed" the federal project. A veto of this particular project could be
termed a defeat of the purpose of the reservation, which was used as a
power site. The Court failed, however, to discuss whether a compromise
could have been reached that would have accomodated at least some of the
goals of state law without halting theconstruction of the power project and
thereby defeating the purpose of the reservation. Instead, the Court
insisted that authorization of the project was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the FPC.'5' Thus, although the facts of the case conform to
the Court's requirement that the federal purpose be "defeated" before state
law is disregarded, it is not clear that the Court at the time would only have
disregarded state law to avoid frustrating such a federal purpose.
The Court next addressed this issue in Arizona v. California,'5 ' which
involved a complex adjudication of water rights or the Colorado River
under the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The Court held that under the Act
the Secretary of the Interior not only had the authority to divide up water
among the five states in the case and the United States, but that he could
also allocate water among users in each state regardless of state law. The
Court relied on language in the cases of Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken15 3 and approved in City of Fresno v. California.154
In Ivanhoe, the Court held that where the federal government had
placed a 160-acre limit on the amount of land irrigable by one of its
irrigation projects, section 8 of the Reclamation Act 55 did not compel the
149. Id. at 702.
150. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
151. 349 U.S. at 444-45.
152. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See text accompanying note 78 supra.
153. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
154. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
155. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). The relevant
language of the Act is as follows:
§ 372: The right to the use of water acquired under the provision5 of . . . [§ 383] of this
[title] shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right.
§ 383: Nothing in . . . [§ 372] shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,
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United States to comply with a state law requiring the government to
supply water to a person owning 640 acres. In dicta the Court read section
8 as requiring the United States to comply with state law only when it was
necessary to acquire vested water rights.t5 6 Under section 8, the Court
found that the federal government may "impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the overall objectives
thereof."
157
Similarly, in City of Fresno, the Court dismissed a suit against the
United States for lack of consent to be sued. In the suit the city had sought
an injunction against a reclamation project and a declaration that under
various California laws the municipality had statutory priority to water
involved in the project. 158 In dicta the Court stated that the effect of section
8 of the Reclamation Act was not to allow state law to prevent the United
States from exercising its power of eminent domain. Instead, section 8
merely left to state law "the definition of the property interests, if any, for
which compensation must be made."' 59 Thus, Arizona v. California and
two of the cases it relied on did not illustrate any traditional deference to
state water law, at least in the dicta.
The present Court attempted to rectify this treatment of state water
law in California v. United States, 60 decided on the same day as United
States v. New Mexico. California also concerned a federal water
reclamation project under the Reclamation Act. The Court undertook a
detailed narration of the history of the Act to illustrate that the Act
reflected an attitude of cooperative federalism.161 It disavowed the dicta in
Ivanhoe and City of Fresno discussed above, stating that in Arizona v.
California there was no need for the Court to reaffirm this dicta, and held
that state law can impose conditions on permits granted to the United
States as long as the conditions are not inconsistent with congressional
provisions authorizing the project. 62 The Court went on to say that section
8 cannot be read to require the Secretary of the Interior to comply with
state law only when it becomes necessary to purchase or condemn vested
water rights.163 Thus, the Court was attempting to apply retroactively a
principle of traditional deference to state law.
use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in
conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any wayaffect any right ofanyState or
of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or userofwaterin, to, orfrom
any interstate stream or waters thereof.
156. 357 U.S. at 291.
157. Id. at 295.
158. 372 U.S. at 628.
159. Id. at 630.
160. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in both California v.
United States and United States v. New Mexico.
161. California, 438 U.S. at 650.
162. Id. at 673-74.
163. Id. at 674.
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In light of the recent decisions in both California and New Mexico,
the Court is apparently tightening up its interpretation of allowable federal
control over state water law both as to the implied reservation doctrine and
specific statutory delegations of power to the federal government, such as
the Reclamation Act.
Arizona v. California raises an additional issue that the Court did not
directly address. In that case, both the State of New Mexico and the United
States were parties to the action. A master was appointed to make findings
of fact and law, which the Court specifically adopted. 16
4
The master concluded that water for the Gila National Forest, as
well as for ten other forests, was to be reserved for the following purposes:
(1) protection of watersheds and the maintenance of natural flow in
streams below the sheds; (2) production of timber; (3) production of forage
for animals; (4) protection and propagation of wildlife; and (5) recreation
for the general public.165 Although Arizona concerned an adjudication of
the rights to use water from the Gila and San Francisco Rivers, which run
through the Gila National Forest, and not the Rio Mimbres, the river in
New Mexico, this difference would not affect the purposes for which the
forest could be used, as found by the special master. Thus, under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel166 the United States and New Mexico were
bound by this earlier adjudication and the issue of the purposes for which
the Gila National Forest may be used could not be relitigated, as it was in
New Mexico. 67 That the Court chose not to deal with this issue may also
be indicative of the Court's eagerness to set forth the uses for which the
federal government could obtain water rights under the implied
reservation doctrine, thereby guaranteeing a larger role for states in
determining water rights.
III. CONCLUSION
According to the Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico,
Congress intended to reserve water by implication for national forests only
if this water were to be used to conserve water flows and to furnish a
continuous supply of timber. Water for other legitimate purposes, such as
recreation, wildlife conservation, and cattle grazing, must now be obtained
164. 373 U.S. at 601.
165. Report of Special Master at 96 (December 5, 1960), as cited in Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963).
166. The RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS provides: "Where a question of fact essential to the
judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action, .. ".
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), the findings of a master, to tile
extent the court adopts them, are considered to be findings by the court.
167. See 438 U.S. at 700-01 n.4 for the Court's only reference to the master's report, The Court
discussed only the part of the master's report which dealt with Indian reservations and did not discuss




via state water law or through the purchase or condemnation of other
users' water rights and not through the inherent rights of the United States
as owner of the federal reservation. In finding such limited purposes for
which water can be obtained under the doctrine, the Court has ignored
well-established uses of the forests that were definitely contemplated when
the forests were established. The Court has thereby frozen the uses that can
be made of water in the forests.
The Court's purpose, although thinly disguised as a statutory
interpretation, was in actuality to decide the case in favor of state's
rights,"' even at the cost of wooden readings of statutes, legislative history,
and case law precedents. One may also question the validity of analyzing
an eighty-year-old act 69 to determine the congressional purpose for
reserving public land for national forests, especially in light of the fact that
Congress has clarified such purposes as recently as 1960.70
Congress, of course, could relieve the problem by enacting legislation
setting up a procedure to quantify future water needs on federal
reservations. Such a quantification would enable states and private users
to plan for future water use along with the federal government and give
them some security with respect to availability of water for future needs.' 7
In enacting such legislation, Congress could consider the possibility of
compensating water users who had no vested right to the use of water
under the implied reservation doctrine, 72 and whose water is appropriated
for a federal reservation. These types of provisions would lessen the impact
of the implied reservation doctrine on states and private users.17 Based on
Congress' demonstrated inability to pass this type of legislation, however,
it is unlikely that such legislation will be enacted.
7 4
Under the Court's analysis of relevant legislation, any water needed
for uses other than the two narrow purposes recognized by the Court
would have to be obtained under state law. This could be disastrous for
such purposes as recreation, fish, and wildlife conservation, as under state
168. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:A Preliminary View 90 HARV. L. Ray. 293 (1976).The
article analyzes Justice Rehnquist's "ideological commitments," which include, according to the
author, a commitment to resolve conflicts between state and federal authority in favor of the state.
169. Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976).
170. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
171. Federal-State Conflicts, supra note 58, at 510-11.
172. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
173. According to ope commentator, however, as of 1976 there had been only one case involving
a challenge by a private user whose use was impaired under the implied reservation doctrine. Note, New
Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 975, 987
(1976). This implies that the problem of conflicts between the states and private users on the one hand
and the federal government on the other, is probably greatly exaggerated. For planning purposes,
however, quantification of probable federal uses would, of course, be invaluable to both state and
private water users.
174. Professor Morreale has examined the numerous futile attempts Congress has made at
enacting such legislation. See Federal-State Conflicts, supra note 58.
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appropriative water laws these uses are not preferred uses.175 Thus, the
New Mexico decision may signal trouble for national forests in
implementing their multiple-use programs.
Susan Hoffman Adams
175. UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF TIE NATION'S
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 142 (1970) For the probable result of the
Court's interpretation of New Mexico under New Mexico law, see note 88 supra,
